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ABSTRACT 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and swarming have become very important operational 
terms parallel to the improvements in wireless network technologies. These relatively 
new concepts are being widely used in many operational applications. The main purpose 
of this research effort is to examine the metrics of NCW, and the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) swarms in electronic attack (EA) missions.  
 UAVs have already been used in many military operations. Swarming a number 
of small UAVs in a distributed beamforming approach to have the desired operational 
effect is the current popular research area. Distributed beamforming and swarm behavior 
of self-synchronized autonomous UAVs are investigated in this study.  
 Two simulation scenarios were created and implemented to show the 
effectiveness of EA against radars and wireless communication links. In reality, EA 
against a single node in a network, such as a radar or communication link, is unlikely to 
be successful by itself, however simulation results showed that the decision making 
process of the enemy network and OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) cycle is directly 
vulnerable to jamming. 
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), looking at the technology from the military 
perspective, are currently being used for missions in critical environments with intense 
threats without risk to personnel. While the history of vehicles similar in many respects to 
modern UAVs goes back to World War II, their use has become common of late due to 
improvements in electronic and software technologies that make it possible to develop 
cost efficient and well performing systems. 
Beyond the desire for flying an aircraft unmanned, the potential applications of 
such systems have become an area of interest for many governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Because of their “unmanned” feature, UAVs were first met 
with a large degree of skepticism. This was countered with the reality that separation of a 
human from the aircraft physically not only eliminated the risk of loss of life, but also led 
to economic savings on manufacturing and operating costs. 
UAVs have been and are currently being used for many military operations, 
ranging from reconnaissance to intelligence missions and from missile attack to radio 
relay missions.  Electronic Warfare (EW) applications, such as electronic attack using 
UAVs, are gaining acceptance over time. 
 
Figure 1.   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (From [1]). 
Every new development in warfare illuminates an idea in the opponents mind 
about the counter measure to be used against new ideas. Today’s technology and complex 
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warfare environment requires smaller platforms that are easy and cheap to manufacture, 
transport, maintain, use, and are survivable. With all of these properties and smaller radar 
cross-sections, UAVs are playing a crucial role for military operations. Specifically, as 
the main research area of this thesis, electronic attack (EA) missions using UAVs 
engaging in swarm tactics within network centric warfare is attractive to many countries 
around the globe.  
A. MOTIVATION 
As stated earlier, UAVs are gaining importance for military and non-military 
applications all over the world. Parallel to the improvement in UAV capabilities, the 
Turkish Armed Forces updates its own tactical and strategic requirements. 
Commensurate with this, the aviation industry works to develop national UAV prototypes 
designed for the needs of the Turkish Military. It is obvious that the engineering, design 
and manufacturing processes of such advanced systems are complicated and cannot be 
developed in isolation from real world experiences.  
This project will try to put forward some basic fundamentals of electronic 
warfare, limitations associated with the electromagnetic spectrum and geographical 
properties of the Turkish terrain. Of course this is not a unique or complete supplement 
for the decision makers, but most probably will provide a fresh perspective on EW. 
B. RESEARCH SCOPE AND PREVIOUS WORK 
One previous NPS master’s thesis undertaken by Kocaman [2] stimulated the 
main idea of this research. He asked the question “How can distributed beamforming and 
opportunistic array concepts be applied to UAV swarms?”  and tried to find possible 
solutions to the main challenges in realizing wireless beamforming in a swarm UAV 
network and several military applications [2]. At the end of the research, he outlined 
some key challenges related to the scope of using UAVs in electronic warfare. 
Another NPS master’s thesis written by Erdemli [3] constructed a broad guide to 
UAS employment for EW purposes, as stated in the declaration of thesis scope. Certainly, 
it is not a new idea to use UAVs for EW missions. When examined from the swarm UAV 
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perspective, EW missions are very prone to some limitations that confine the capabilities 
of current systems. These limitations provided the basic motivation for this thesis. 
The required data links and wireless networks used to conduct any net-centric 
controlled distributed electronic warfare missions have some limitations. One of the most 
important limitations is transmission losses due to range and geo-localization problems. 
Although transmission losses are a general problem for communications systems in any 
domain, they are more severe for wireless communications. These limitations can easily 
be addressed to the local position of the UAV inside the battlefield. In other words, 
geographic position of the area defines the capability of the data link, and mission 
effectiveness of a single or a swarm of UAVs. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles are increasingly important in today’s electronic warfare 
environment. There is a considerable trend toward research on operations of net-centric 
controlled distributed electronic warfare using UAVs and other low cost lower 
performance platforms. 
UAVs and their subsystems, used for both civilian and military applications are a 
very wide area of research. In this thesis, the scope is confined to the effectiveness and 
performance of UAVs in a net-centric controlled distributed environment, given 
transmission losses and geographical limitations due to geo-localization problems within 
Turkish terrain. Radiated power requirements, range limitations and associated 
transmission losses, and the geo-localization problem will be analyzed and an optimal 
solution will be proposed at the end of the research. 
C. GENERAL REVIEW 
1. Background 
In today’s information age, every step taken to destroy or weaken enemy forces 
motivates a counter measure to reduce or completely eliminate the effectiveness of the 
associated attack. In the past, human actions occupied the center of all measures, and 
conceptually affected the warfare environment. But, modern warfare conceptually seeks 
optimal solutions to conduct missions with smaller, cheaper, and in many cases now, 
unmanned systems. UAVs have proven their success through the increase in war-fighting 
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capabilities of armies in real operations. Because of their contributions, many nations and 
militaries around the world have re-configured their military aviation branch. The 
Turkish Air Force is one of the more active users of UAVs and there are many ongoing 
national and international projects associated with this relatively new Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS) concept. 
Finally, as stated in the scope of this research, advantages of UAVs can be 
examined with these limitations in mind and an optimal solution can be achieved and 
modeled for stand-in jamming missions. Stand-in jamming is very similar to stand-off 
jamming. However, stand-in jammers require less effective radiated power, with the 
major difference being the position of the jammers.  Stand-in jammers conduct missions 
much closer to the target than the stand-off jammers can. This helps the electronic attack 
mission by shortening the burn through range. Burn through range can be explained as 
the range at which the enemy radar overcomes the jamming effect. 
2. Defining the Problem 
As one of the main elements in today’s modern battlefield, many articles, papers 
and reports have been published on UAVs. Parallel to this, a significant amount of 
development has been achieved on the capabilities of UAVs. As stated earlier, this 
research will mainly focus on electronic warfare applications of these low-cost unmanned 
combat systems. Using UAVs in electronic warfare has a lot of associated advantages. 
Some of these are: 
 They require low power. 
 Their observability is relatively low. 
 They have a reduced risk. 
 They may be more cost-efficient. 
 Their mission sustainability is higher. 
 They can be less vulnerable to enemy weapons. 
The employment of UAVs in various battle scenarios, both for training purposes 
and real war-fighting missions, stimulated the idea to deploy teams of multiple UAVs in 
a cooperative or competitive manner [4]. Teams of multiple UAVs can be thought of as a 
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swarm. Swarm characteristics can be seen among the collaborative insects and other 
animals within nature. These groups of insects, such as ants and bees, create a “swarm 
intelligence” as a result of their workload feedback. In another NPS thesis, Frantz [5] 
explained the intelligence created by the swarm. According to Frantz, the self-
organization of the group into ordered patterns is an intelligent characteristic. For a 
swarm to form ordered patterns, it needs to ‘analyze’ patterns while finding the optimal 
method [5]. This is exactly the workload feedback, mentioned as the source for 
emergence of swarm intelligence. The interactions among the autonomous individuals 
within the swarm rely on mutual local sensing. 
We can easily talk about a communication requirement for the swarm. In a 
general sense, this is a wireless communication medium. Wireless communication is 
much more vulnerable to external effects. These effects can be due to geo-localization 
problems or to other intruders sharing the same battlefield, as in the case of an enemy. As 
well as enemy ground EW emissions, the threat can also be an aerial aggressor. The other 
main source of trouble can be addressed as range limitations due to the localization 
problem. This research will help to understand limitations due to range and geographical 
conditions over an operational area of interest, specified as Turkish terrain. Transmission 
characteristics in this specific geography and associated limitations will help the Turkish 
Air Force decide how to optimally use or develop current and future systems. 
3. Thesis Outline 
 Before investigating new electronic warfare applications of UAVs, a proper 
background for the research starts with a literature review and historical milestones. This 
research effort will start with a review of current electronic warfare elements and 
subdivisions. By the end of the review, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and systems 
in EW applications will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter II. By doing so, we will 
attempt to answer some basic questions: 
 What is the historical background of electronic warfare? 
 What are the elements of electronic warfare? 
 What are the electronic attack techniques? 
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 What is stand-in jamming and how can UAVs be used for electronic 
attack? 
After this literature review, the net-centric controlled distributed operations and 
will be discussed to address the following questions in Chapter III: 
 What is network-centric distributed warfare? 
 What is the radar range in a jamming environment? 
The previous review will help in the study of radar range equation in the network 
environment, data link limitations and propagation loses due to range, presented in 
Chapter IV. The geo-localization problem over Turkish terrain will also be examined in 
this chapter: 
 What are the radar equations? 
 What are the data link limitations and propagation losses due to range? 
Chapter V will concentrate on optimizing and modeling stand-in techniques with 
a single UAV. Essentially, a single typical (small) UAV is often not capable of 
conducting such missions without any being engaged in a collective effort. Because of 
their relatively small size compared to manned aircraft, UAVs have some limitations in 
payload capacity and power generated that directly affect provided jammer power. But, 
taken as a collective whole, the individual abilities of single UAVs inside the swarm can 
easily make up the required parameters. Likewise, addressing another common concern 
with modern net centric warfare, transmission limitations and vulnerabilities for a UAV 
swarm can be eliminated with one or more radio relay UAVs incorporated as elements of 
the swarm and network. 




II. ELECTRONIC WARFARE BASICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
UAVS 
According to Schleher’s definition, electronic warfare (EW) is a military action 
whose objective is to control the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum [6]. Of course, the EM 
spectrum is not typically considered as solely an operational area of military 
organizations. As well as military usage, the spectrum is used heavily for civilian 
purposes. We limit the discussion to military use of the spectrum, and thus the very first 
definition implies the military use of EM and directed energy. The success of EW can 
largely be measured by the successful control of the EM spectrum. 
The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a construct of the range and allocations of 
frequencies from zero to infinity by which EM radiation through free space (versus 
wired) is defined. In other words, we can state the EMS as the band designations of EM 
radiation. Figure 2 shows the EMS [7]. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Electromagnetic Spectrum (From [7]) 
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The EMS can also be defined as the carrier domain for the required information 
before, during, and after military operations. As well as denying the usage of the EMS by 
the enemy, EW also tries to maintain safe and reliable information sharing between 
friendly assets. Looking from this perspective, EW can easily be placed as a component 
under Information Warfare (IW). 
A. ELECTRONIC WARFARE ELEMENTS 
Electronic Warfare is one of the crucial elements of war fighting in the modern 
battle management concept. The definition of EW addresses any military action involving 
the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the critical information within 
the battle environment or to attack the enemy. According to U.S. and other nation 
doctrines, the three main subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic attack 
(EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). These are modern 
definitions of EW elements, which are revised from previous military terminology. The 
corresponding names for former definitions are respectively electromagnetic 
countermeasures (ECM), electromagnetic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), and 
electronic warfare support measures (ESM) [6]. These earlier terms are still in common 
use within the industry. 
 
Figure 3.   Electromagnetic Warfare Elements 
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We should have a quick look at the definition of IW before going further. Again, 
Schleher [6] defines IW as a broad military concept, whose objective is to control the 
management and use of information to provide military advantage. IW operations are two 
sided, which corresponds to both attacking the enemy to prevent critical information from 
being used by the opponent and ensuring one’s own information systems are protected 
against an enemy’s IW measures. 
1. Electronic Attack (EA) 
The EA subdivision of EW involves the use of electromagnetic or directed energy 
to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or 
destroying enemy combat capability [6]. EA was previously known as Electronic Counter 
Measures (ECM). EA has two different means of taking offensive action to interrupt or 
attack the enemy use of the EMS. Non-destructive EA (“soft kill”) prevents or reduces 
the use of enemy weapon systems. Electronic jamming and deception are two typical 
types of non-destructive EA. Non-destructive EA, as understood from the name, does not 
intend to destroy enemy weapons physically. Conversely, destructive EA (“hard kill”) 
uses Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs) and directed energy to attack and potentially 
destroy enemy capabilities. 
2. Electronic Protection (EP) 
Electronic Protection (EP), formerly known as Electronic Counter Counter 
Measures (ECCM), defines all active and passive measures taken to protect one’s own 
assets including personnel, facilities and equipment against an aggressor’s use of 
electromagnetic or directed energy. The word “aggressor” is used because the effective 
EA could either be employed by friendly sources or by an enemy. Because of the cause 
and effect relationship between EA and EP, Schleher [6] called it “a battle of resources,” 
with the advantage going to the side that invests the most resources. A few examples of 
EP are electronic masking, the use of wartime reserve modes (WARM), electronic 
hardening, emission control (EMCON), and the integration of EW systems into overall 
spectrum management [6].  
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3. Electronic Warfare Support (ES) 
It is obvious that the electromagnetic spectrum is also, intentionally or 
unintentionally, used by the enemy. We need adequate real time information about enemy 
EMS activities. The ES subdivision of EW includes intercepting, identifying, analyzing, 
and locating enemy radiation activities. We can generalize these activities as the 
parameters of enemy radiation. ES includes actions tasked by, or under direct control of 
an operational commander [7]. The data collected by ES means can help to produce 
signal intelligence (SIGINT). It is a very common mistake to confuse these two 
overlapping disciplines. The nuance between these two are defined in [8] as: 
The distinction between intelligence and ES is determined by who tasks or 
controls the collection assets, what they are tasked to provide, and for 
what purpose they are tasked. ES is achieved by assets tasked or 
controlled by an operational commander. The purpose of ES tasking is 
immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future 
operations, and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance and  
homing. However, the same assets and resources that are tasked with  
ES can simultaneously collect intelligence that meets other collection 
requirements. 
In this research, we deal with EW and its subdivisions. Intelligence and related 
subdivisions are out of the scope of this thesis. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF UAVS 
1. History of UAV Systems 
The importance of UAVs for both military operations and civilian purposes is 
growing at a rate equal to their widened scope of employment. UAVs have certain 
unprecedented advantages. Some of the most important ones are: 
 They are smaller and cheaper compared to manned aerial vehicles, 
therefore they are affordable for many purposes. 
 Their capacity is not limited by human factors, especially physical human 
capabilities, making them easier to develop and maintain. 
 They typically have a somewhat smaller radar cross section (RCS), which 
makes their observability relatively low. 
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 They can get closer to the operational area of interest or the target, 
increasing the capability of tactical and operational forces to beyond line 
of sight (BLOS). 
Looking from a historical perspective, early thoughts on unmanned flying objects 
can be dated back to the early days of aviation itself. The desire to see what is happening 
beyond natural obstacles was not new at the time, even when the first aircraft was 
invented. On the other hand, sending weapons or bombs to distant targets was always a 
technological objective. In the following paragraphs, we look at the early history of 
UAVs, to see the emerging idea and early development period. 
In comparison, the emergence of modern UAVs is fairly recent. At the beginning 
of the1900s, UAVs were used experimentally for research. The pre-World War I (WWI) 
period witnessed a few unsuccessful research projects to employ UAS for military use.  
The United States, Britain and Germany all tried to develop unmanned attack systems 
during the war.  Even though none of these experimental designs proved to be 
operationally effective, these efforts led to the development of the first missiles; the 
guidance system requirement remained largely unsolved until the interwar years. These 
projects were commonly called flying bombs during this experimental period. Although 
they were not conventional UAVs by the modern definition, their radio guidance systems 
developed the fundamentals of controlling the UAVs. At the end of this period, the very 
first successful radio-controlled unmanned target aircraft “Fairey Queen” entered the 
British Armed Forces service [9]. 
Confined by economic conditions and treaty restrictions, German engineers 
started to think about the war fighting potential of the new unmanned vehicles. After an 
unproductive period due to decreased funding, a very important step toward the 
development of modern UAVs was taken by the Germans when they developed the V-1 
as the first successful cruise missile. The Germans regarded this new weapon as a good 
response against the superior air threat posed by the Allies. Although it lacked accuracy 
compared to modern systems, the resulting weapon was an unpredictable threat to the 
Allies. Especially notable was its capability to penetrate through to underground targets 
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due to its free fall kinetic energy.  Its economic and psychological effects can be 
summarized statistically, as seen in Table 1 [9].  
Ratio of economic loss (Germans / Allies) 1:4 
Total V-1s Launched 10,492 
Ground / Air Launched 8,892/1,600 
Reaching to Target 2,419 
Shoot Downs  By fighters 1847 
By guns 1878 
By balloons 232 
Civilians Injured / Killed 17,981 / 6,184 
Cost to Germans  £12,600,000 
Cost to Allies  £47,635,000 
Table 1.   Important Statistics of V-1 Campaign (After [9]) 
The V-1 was limited by the technology available at that time. After WWII, UAV 
technologies underwent a set of improvements, primarily to design and develop 
unmanned weapons systems. The two superpowers of the Cold War era, the U.S. and the 
USSR, were both aware of the deficiencies associated with the technology used in the V-
1s. This period witnessed a competition between these two superpowers. In the early days 
of this cold war period, the results were less impressive than expected. There was an 
apparent halt on projects until more sophisticated surface-to-surface cruise missiles were 
developed with high levels of reliability and lethality. The Snark and Navaho programs 
are examples of these development projects; however, the programs proved to be 
unreliable and were later cancelled.  
One of the areas explored by the superpowers was that of airborne decoys.  
Airborne decoys were first introduced to simulate the RCS of currently employed 
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manned aircraft. In the early 1950s, the United States worked on three airborne drone 
projects. The third drone, called Quail, was designed to simulate the B-52 bomber and 
first flew successfully in 1956. During the same period, the Soviet Union  produced a few 
medium range cruise missiles. Cruise missile projects were followed in parallel by 
ballistic system projects, and first Sputnik satellite launch in 1957 [9]. 
From a historical perspective, we can summarize the use of UAVs in operations 
into five main military or political eras of UAV development and employment. The very 
first successful large-scale operational use of UAVs was by Germany during WWII with 
the V-1, used as a weapon against civilian targets. The second era begins with WWII and 
continues through the  Korean War, where UAVs were used against point targets such as 
ships, buildings, and railroads. Third, UAVs had been used in situations where there was 
no military intervention, like North Vietnam and China (1960s and 1970s). Although 
United States had no military encounter with these governments at that time, logistic 
routes to Vietnam were closely watched during this period. The fourth era is marked by 
usage of UAVs within military operations with political constraints, as seen in the 
Vietnam War. The present era we are now in has culminated with the modern concept of 
UAV operations within warfare, beginning with Israeli operations against Syrian forces 
inside Lebanon in the 1980s. This contemporary concept accepts and employs UAV 
capabilities during all phases of war ([9] pp.78 and 115).  
Having examined the technological and conceptual development of UAV systems 
we now discuss the classification of UAVs. 
2. Classification of UAVs 
There are quite a few different types of UAV classification schemes found in the 
literature. Therefore it is very hard to make a definite classification and use it as a 
reference. But, in general, many researchers have tried to classify UAVs by weight, 
range, maximum altitude, wing span, engine type, etc.  
a. Classification by Weight 
 Super Heavy Weight UAVs: Over 2000 kg. 
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 Heavy Weight UAVs: Between 200 kg and 2000 kg. 
 Medium Weight UAVs: Between 50 kg and 200 kg. 
 Light Weight UAVs: Between 5 kg and 50 kg. 
 Micro UAVs: Under 5 kg [10]. 
b. Classification by Endurance and Range 
Endurance of an aircraft system is defined by the total amount of time that 
the aircraft can stay airborne once employed. This property directly affects the maximum 
operational range. 
 Long Endurance UAVs: Endurance time more than 24 hours, and 
operational range between 1,500 km and 22,000 km. 
 Medium Endurance UAVs: Endurance between 5 hours and 24 
hours, and operational range between 100 km and 1500 km. 
 Low Endurance UAVs: Endurance time less than 5 hours, and 
operational range less than 100 km [10]. 
c. Classification by Flight Ceiling 
One of the most important critical technical parameters for military 
aircraft systems is the maximum operational altitude measurement. Altitude directly 
affects the survivability, lethality, endurance and operational range of the system. 
 High Altitude UAVs: Ceiling over 10,000 m. 
 Medium Altitude UAVs: Ceiling between 1,000 m and 10,000 m. 
 Low Altitude UAVs: Ceiling up to 1,000 m [10]. 
d. Classification by Wing Loading 
Wing loading is a technical parameter calculated by dividing total weight 
of the UAV by wing area. 
 High Loading UAVs: More than 100 kg/ m2. 
 Medium Loading UAVs: Between 50 kg/m2 and 100 kg/ m2. 
 Low Loading UAVs: Less than 50 kg/m2 [10]. 
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e. Classification by Engine Type 
Another classification is done by engine type. Of course, the engine type is 
related to the physical dimension of UAV. Major types of engines used for UAVs are fuel 
rotary, turbofan, two-stroke, piston, propeller, turboprop, electric, and push and pull. 
 
Classification by Weight Classification by Endurance 
Super Heavy > 2000 kg and Range 
Heavy 200-2000 kg Long Endurance > 24 hours 
Medium 50-200 kg 1500-22000km 
Light 5-50 kg Medium 
Endurance 
5-24 hours 
Micro < 5 kg 100-1500km 
Classification by Engine Type Low Endurance < 5 hours 
Fuel Rotary < 100 km 
Turbofan Classification by Ceiling 
Two-stroke High Altitude > 10000 m 
Piston Medium Altitude 1000-10000 m 
Electric Low Altitude < 1000 m 
Propeller Classification by Wing Loading 
Turboprop High Loading > 100 kg/ m2 
Push and Pull Medium Loading 50-100 kg/ m2 
  Low Loading < 50 kg/ m2 
Table 2.   Classification of UAVs 
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III. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE AND SWARM 
NETWORKS 
A. SWARM NETWORKS AND DISTRIBUTED BEAMFORMING WITH 
UAV SWARMS 
Many technological inventions and concepts are motivated by the natural 
behavior of animals. A few decades ago, people started to think about the collective 
behavior of animal colonies, such as a flock of birds, a school of fish, and a colony of 
bees. After some observations, it was obvious that the colony had a learning intelligence, 
and an emergent behavior arose from this dynamic process. For example, in a series of 
experiments on a colony of ants with a choice between two unequal length paths leading 
to a source of food, biologists have observed that ants tended to use the shortest route 
[11]. This mutual behavior is called “swarm behavior.” 
1. Swarm Behavior 
 Keeping the ant colony example in mind, we can make a general definition for 
swarming. In [12], swarming is defined as a collection of autonomous individuals relying 
on local sensing and reactive behaviors interacting such that a global behavior emerges 
from the interactions. 
Small contributions of autonomous elements are regarded as reactive behaviors, 
because they do not require a plan. Emerging global behavior in the swarm develops after 
a period of time. We shall simply call it locally motivated behavior and it directly 
depends on local sensing. In other words, local sensing motivates the instant reactive 
behavior of individual elements. Of course biological swarms are not within the scope of 
this research. But, it is very important to know some basic properties of swarms to 
understand distributed beamforming using UAVs in a swarm. 
2. Distributed Beamforming with UAV Swarms 
 In today’s modern warfare concept, smaller assets with cheaper 
manufacturing/maintenance costs and lower fatal risks are gaining in importance. 
Cooperative efforts of these relatively small assets, collected together inside a network, 
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can result in the same capabilities as with traditional larger platforms. The focus of this 
thesis is on the application where we use a swarm of UAVs distributed over a given 
terrain, all with limited capabilities of radiated power, and reach the required Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (SNR) to effectively conduct EA. In other words, instead of using a 
traditional jammer antenna array, an adequate number of UAVs in a swarm can 
collectively form the same jammer power and achieve the total required SNR, as 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.    (a) Antenna beam formed by a single UAV and  
(b) Antenna beam formed by a UAV swarm 
Using a UAV swarm for Distributed Beamforming (DBF) requires understanding 
the wireless sensor network architecture. This will be helpful to propose a possible 
solution for a distributed jamming attack and some transmission and communication 
problems, especially over the Turkish geography as being in the scope of this research. 
Swarm behavior in the previous discussion is concerned with local sensing inside the 
swarm. In a UAV swarm network, individual elements, each which will be called nodes 
from now on, are also controlled in a similar way. As proposed in [13] and [14], network 
nodes are required to self-synchronize to a common time and frequency reference, thus 
the relative locations, and phase offsets of all the nodes are known by the central source 
or synchronizer as well as the nodes themselves.  
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For complex geographies like the terrain of Turkey, the central source for 
appropriate time and frequency synchronization can also be a solution to overcome 
transmission loses and range limitations due to the geo-localization problem. Let us think 
about an area of operational interest (AOI), which is beyond line of sight (BLOS) of the 
UAV base station. In the absence of satellite communication links, a synchronization 
node can act as a relay station between the operational UAV swarm and the base station. 
In such a mission, DBF can be modeled as a relay channel, where the base station is the 
source and the synchronization channel is the relay node. The synchronization node can 
contain a single UAV, or it can be another UAV swarm, depending on the required SNR 
value in the warfare environment. Figure 5 is a brief illustration of this concept. 
 
Figure 5.   Synchronization and Relay Nodes 
When taking the synchronization node into account, the generic analysis of 
performance is related to ideal weight magnitudes, available channel state information, 
and the number of cooperating elements [14]. In this analysis, there is a very important 
property of aerial vehicles that can be regarded as an associated drawback. The location 
of the relay elements, relative to base station, to the destination operational swarm, and to 
each other inside the synchronization node is very hard to estimate. But, rapid advances 
in computer technologies and positioning systems allow each element know their own 
relative position and share this information with others in timely manner. GPS trackers 
can be successfully employed and combined with the increased transmission capabilities 
of each element, and a very accurate synchronization to a reference in time and frequency 
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can be achieved.  It will be helpful to make the complex weight calculations easier, 
because the sensors within the SYNC node are no longer fixed.  
 If we consider the synchronization node as a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
and destination UAV swarm as a single destination node, we can argue that the spatial 
distribution of sensor nodes in WSN is Gaussian [15], [16]. Let there be N UAVs all 
located on the ( x  y) plane, as shown in Figure 6 [15]. 
 
Figure 6.   Geometrical Positions and Notations (After [15]) 
Polar coordinates of kth UAV are noted as rk,k  , where k =1, …, N, and k  is 
the initial phase of node k. The destination node is located at A,0,0   spherical 
coordinates. Angles   [0, ] and   [, ] represent elevation direction and azimuth 
direction, respectively. To make the analysis more simple, the location of each UAV is 
chosen randomly with uniform distribution. Let the destination node, in our case the 
destination UAV swarm, be located in spherical coordinates A,,  , and dk ,   
donate the Euclidean distance from kth UAV to the destination node. If A  rk  in the far-
field region, this distance can be written as: 
 dk ,   A2  rk2  2rk Asin( )cos( k )  (1) 
 21
 Node locations are positioned as rk,k   in Figure 6, where 
r  r1, r2,..., rN   0, R N  and   1,2,...,N   , N . Array factors of each node 
can be written as: 
 
F , | r,   1
N
e jke
j 2 dk (, ) 
k1
N 1N e




where initial phase of node k is k   2 dk (0,0 ), and   is the carrier wavelength. 
Coupling effects among all nodes are assumed to be negligible. In the far-field A  rk  , 
and (1) can be approximated as: 
 dk ,   A rk sin cos( k ) (3) 
 Thus, far-field beam pattern is approximated by 
 
F , | r,   1
N
e




 As stated earlier, distributed beamforming using the above equations depends 
highly on the accurate knowledge of all nodes. Furthermore, synchronization of all nodes 
relative to   is very important. Next section will deal with basics of Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW). 
B. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
 The early history of the network centric warfare (NCW) concept goes back to the 
beginning of the information age, when economic foundations started to realize the 
importance of dynamic change. Technological improvements let the organizations share 
and create centralized mutual information, and then experience its potential power. This 
new condition showed that no economic organization could survive without changing. 
Being aware of this new challenge, organizations started to create new relationships with 
others, and share both human and organizational behaviors. Looking at this from the 
military perspective, this was a very robust idea to link the warfighting capabilities of  
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geographically scattered assets within the battlefield. With its three key steps, the NCW 
concept helped to create a mutual situational awareness and understanding of operational 
needs [17]: 
 First of all, the location of the organizations or warfighting assets is very 
important in NCW. In the past, geographical dispersion from other units 
was a deadly drawback, because these military assets were very subject to 
attacks and other threats. But in the NCW concept, warfighting assets are 
free from geographical constraints. This means that the geographical 
location of any individual node, source of information, or force asset is no 
longer perceived as a disadvantage. 
 A second key feature in NCW is that all of the economic organizations or 
military units must be knowledgeable. All the nodes inside the network are 
linked to each other, thus a shared situational awareness arises from this 
collective information exchange. By self-synchronizing to a central source 
of information, every single unit understands the needs of the whole 
structure. In military terms, every unit knows and understands the needs of 
commanders. This feature also makes the autonomous operations of the 
assets more effective, given the proper real-time central information. In 
this step, central knowledge is converted into battlefield knowledge at the 
operational level.  
 Finally, a proficient and effective linkage among organizations or assets 
within the battlefield is a key feature. By ensuring this, geographically 
separated units will create a synergy. This can be achieved with a reliable 
and powerful information infrastructure that makes mission and 
responsibility reassignments easier and timely. 
1. Origins of Network Centric Warfare 
 When this NCW concept was first announced in [18] in 1998, the origins of NCW 
were analogous to the fundamental changes in business, both in the USA and around the 
world. The transition and adoption of NCW by the military can be seen as the natural 
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response of the military to the needs of its age. Although the NCW concept is still not 
accepted universally, it is largely accepted as an ongoing transformation in military 
affairs parallel to economic changes. 
By the beginning of the 21st Century, economic organizations and firms 
concentrated on larger and more dynamic learning systems that can easily adopt changes 
within the ecosystem they operate. Firms started to realize that their old competitors can 
be their new partners, and this relationship and the necessary information sharing among 
them can yield a powerful knowledge of the economic system. This meant a major shift 
from a platform focus to a well-designed and powerful network that permits adoption of 
network centric operations. Partners in this new business model were no longer 
independent from each other; on the contrary, they were all members of a dynamic 
economic system. This flexible system helped the firms to make true choices with regard 
to market research and investments, resulting in more prosperity.  
These essential changes in technology, business and daily life opened a new 
perspective in the military’s perception of warfare concepts and tactics. Commanders and 
headquarters started to notice the importance of networking, and the NCW concept was 
slowly adapted and adopted, largely as a result of the migration of new technologies into 
the military command structure. High-speed network links and sensor interactions 
enabled military units to improve their operational effectiveness. Geographically 
separated and dispersed, but well informed, units contributed more to the warfighting 
capability of the entire force [18]. 
Timely information transfers amongst the nodes inside the network through 
linkages create a very powerful effect and a potential warfighting capability. In 
traditional platform-centric warfare, where sensing and engagement phases take place 
under the same system as seen in Figure 7, weapons platforms follows five steps to 
successfully intercept the target [17]: 
 Search and detect the target. 
 Interrogate and identify the target. 
 Decide on engagement. 
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 Give an appropriate order to the weapon associated with engagement 
decision. 
 Fire the weapon. 
 
Figure 7.   Platform-Centric Weapon System (After [17]) 
In platform-centric warfare, operational effectiveness is directly related to the 
onboard sensor’s ability to detect, and the radius of weapon’s maximum affective range. 
Generally, onboard sensors have longer detection ranges than the weapon’s effective 
range as illustrated in Figure 8. This effective range is called effective engagement 
envelope, and reflects the platform’s individual combat power. Conversely, in NCW 
individual capabilities of nodes are digitally linked. Real time accurate information 
exchange between the nodes supports the warfighters situational awareness [17]. It is no 
longer necessary for a weapons platform to use organic sensors with a range greater than 
that of its weapons, as the information that would cue the weapons may now come from 
other sensors on other platforms that are a part of the network. 
 25
 
Figure 8.   Platform-Centric Engagement Envelope (After [17]) 
 Tactical data links are the most indispensable part of network-centric operations 
that ensures the five required steps for a successful engagement can be conducted in a 
timely manner. The NCW structure is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.   Network-Centric Operations (After [17]) 
The similarities between the NCW concept and swarm behavior is clearly seen in 
this brief summary and explanation of NCW. Especially notable is the need for a high-
 26
speed network and link capability, sensor-grid structure, and self-synchronization, all key 
futures for both. Moreover, distributed beamforming using swarms requires the emergent 
global behavior of small and limited capacity UAVs that are scattered, or dispersed, over 
a geographical region. In this model, every individual UAV is analogous to an 
organization in business ecosystem. They are all self-synchronized and adoptive to the 
changes within the network and swarm. Next we continue with the fundamentals of 
NCW. 
2. Fundamentals of Network Centric Warfare 
 To understand the fundamentals of NCW, we examine the three domains of the 
information environment. These are the physical domain, information domain, and 
cognitive domain. NCW is the powerful, reliable, fast, timely, responsive, and flexible 
networking in and among these three domains [19]: 
 Physical Domain: This is the domain where all the military physical 
actions are taken, such as attack and defensive maneuvers. It is clear from 
the name that all of the physical platforms and tactical network links exist 
in this domain. Since it accommodates the physical assets, operational 
effectiveness, operational suitability, and combat power are evaluated in 
this domain. 
 Information Domain: This is the domain where information itself is 
created, managed, and communicated among the forces. In this way, 
warfighters know and understand the commander’s aims. The information 
domain is the place where communication resides. Since it is very 
vulnerable and open to hostile attacks, it must be well protected. 
 Cognitive Domain:  This is the domain where all the brain-storming takes 
place. Since it represents the minds of thinkers, decision-makers or 
commanders, the outcomes of the wars are shaped in this domain. Human 
factors stand in the center of the cognitive domain, and the information 
goes through the individual perspectives of the participants. 
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The NCW architecture is comprised of three grids, which are the global 
information grid, the sensor grid, and the shooter grid [20], [21].  
 The global information grid is the general background for the sensor nodes 
and shooters, where the information is created and shared continuously. 
The physical limits of the global information grid extend from the infinity 
of space to the limit of sea depths, including earth’s atmosphere and 
surface. Sensor and shooter nodes are linked in a network topology. 
 The sensor grid is represented by the sensor network, which has sensor 
nodes such as radar systems. These sensor nodes create emergent sensed 
information linked to the shooter grid. 
 Finally, the shooter grid is occupied by the operational systems, such as 
weapons and jammers.  Since every mission is a unique one, and needs a 
different tactic in a specified place and time, the shooter grid is re-
configurable [21]. 
3. Network Centric Warfare Metrics 
Before touching upon the NCW metrics, the OODA concept should be clarified 
first. The OODA acronym is formed by the first capital letters of Observe, Orient, 
Decide, and Act, which was first introduced by John R. Boyd in his set of briefings on 
competitive strategy ([21], [23–25]). In a networked environment, the assets of military 
power follow the cycle shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.   The OODA Cycle 
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Military activities are confined between two opposing OODA cycles in a warfare 
environment. In other words, two opposing military powers have similar OODA loops, 
and make their own individual decisions that are not known by the adversary. On the 
other hand, some military activities of each side are open for observation and known by 
the opponent. The speed of the OODA cycle iteration period determines the success of 
network centric operations. 
The information network topology is formed by a set of nodes (or warfighting 
assets) interconnected with each other. NCW combines technology, organizational 
structure, command and control, and human factors all together. Network centric 
operations (NCO) are conducted by interconnecting network-space and battle-space. 
These two operational planes are connected to each other and to the OODA loop by 




 Characteristic tempos 
a. Connectivity Measure 
Military network structure is defined in [24] as being very similar to the 
INTERNET network structure. Two very important assumptions are made to analyze a 
military network. These include: 
 The number of nodes within the network is large. 
 There are no differences between the nodes in terms of capabilities and 
roles. The network has a homogenous structure. 
To express the connectivity measure of a network with NT nodes and 
1
2
NT (NT 1) links, we should first explain the definitions. Firstly, a link is a 
communication means between two nodes. Secondly, routes are all possible 
communication directions between two nodes, and each route has at least one link. 
Finally, the connectivity measure of a network can be expressed as [24]: 
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In the equation, N  is the total number of nodes connected to node  . 
N  is the total number of routes that are possible between   and   node pair. K (t) is 
the value of the node  , which represents the capability. L (d, t) is the information flow 
parameter of the route   connecting nodes    and  . Information flow is the function of 
the length d of the route, and time t. Ranges for capability and information flow 
parameters are 0.0  K (t) and L (d, t) 1.0. 
We will make these definitions clear with an example, using a normalized 
value for route length d = 1. Figure 11 shows nodes, links, routes and capability values of 
the nodes. Note that each route contains one or more links. Links between the node pairs 
and possible routes are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 [21]. 
 
 








Table 3.   Available Links in Figure 10 
START NODE END NODE ROUTE 
1 2 1  2 
1 3 1  3 
2 1 2  1 
2 3 2  1  3 
3 1 3  2  1 
3 2 3  2 
Table 4.   All Possible Routes in Figure 10 
The information flow parameter L
 (d, t), which depends on length of 
route d and time t, can be made easier by splitting it into two parts, a time-independent 
value component part L  and a time-dependent flow coefficient part F
 , respectively. 
Time-dependent flow coefficient F
 is scaled by the route length d raised to the power 
 , and ranges between 0 and 1. Then the connectivity measure CM becomes [24]: 
 
 









To clarify these ideas, the connectivity of the network is assumed to be 
time-independent, with a time-dependent flow coefficient is F
 = 0 or 1 showing that two 
nodes are either connected or not, and a scaling exponent of d  is to be  =1 [24]. After 




ROUTE K  
d  CM 
Weight 
1  2 0.9 1 0.9 
1  3 0.9 1 0.9 
2  1 0.55 1 0.55 
2  1  3 0.55 2 0.275 
3  2  1 1 2 0.5 
3  2 1 1 1 
   CM = 5.125
Table 5.   Connectivity Measure Calculations for Figure 10 
Now, think about a reference network where all nodes are fully connected 
and identical. In this homogenous structure, all capability values are equal to 1 
( K  K 1 and F  F ). The reference connectivity measure can be calculated as [24]: 
 
CM
R (t)  NT (NT 1)
1 (NT  2)
2
 (NT  2)(NT 3)
3






It is clearly seen from Equation (7) that the only variable that effects the 
reference connectivity measure value is the total number of nodes NT [26]. The 
numerator in each term inside the square brackets is the number of possible routes of the 
length given in the denominator. Compared to other networks with the same number of 
nodes, the reference network has the highest connectivity measure. 
An example from [21] is used to illustrate the reference network concept. 
A realistic network with four nodes is shown in Figure 12. The nodes have different 
capability values ( K ). In this network, there are two bidirectional and two unidirectional 
links between the nodes. Unidirectional links are from node 2 to node 4 and from node 3 
to node 2. Bidirectional links are between node 1 and node 2, and node 3 and node 4. In 
Figure13, the reference network, which corresponds to the network in Figure 12, is 
shown. Note that all links are bidirectional, homogenous, and have full capability values 
( K  K 1 and F  F ). 
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Figure 12.   Realistic Network with Four Nodes and Heterogeneous Links 
 
Figure 13.   Corresponding Reference Network for Figure 12 
For the example network in Figure 12, the total number of node is NT = 4, 
where reference connectivity measure can be calculated as: 
CM







 32  
Reference connectivity measures are calculated for a number of different 















Table 6.   Connectivity Measure Calculations for Different NT Values 
b. Network Reach 
A reference network with the highest connectivity measure helps to 
normalize this connectivity measure. A normalized connectivity measure is named as 
network reach and becomes [24]: 
 









NT  CMCMR   (8) 
Network reach is a dimensionless value, which is a normalized re-statement of 
connectivity measure. 
c. Network Richness 
The information-processing rate of each node is important for the 
calculation of network richness (RQ). min is the minimum information processing rate 
(1/time) for node   to convert information to knowledge according to Shannon 
Information Entropy. The average rate at which knowledge is measured through the 
network is defined as network richness, and shown in Equation (9).   is the rate at 
which node   processes information at time t. Taking (9) into account, no knowledge is 
created if the information-processing rate is less than min . Conversely, if the 
information-processing rate is 2.72 times faster than min , very little knowledge is 








d. Characteristic Tempos 
Due to technological limitations and telecommunication boundaries, every 
network has a limited maximum information-processing rate. As proposed in [24], every 
network has a characteristic time scale or tempo T . The characteristic tempo of a 
network topology is directly affected by the applied information and communications 
technologies. It is generated by the product of network reach (dimensionless) and 
network richness (1/time), and can be thought of as information exchange frequency: 
 T  IRRQ (Hz)   (10) 
We can define a characteristic decision making speed C2  for every C2 
system. The last two phases in the OODA Cycle in Figure 14 depend on network 
capability and the limitation of physical actions. Physical actions can be sorted as 
deployment speed, synchronization of weapon systems and platforms, and engagement.  
1  and 2  represents the decide-to-act and act-to-observe action tempos, respectively. 
Finally, we have  3 1/ T 1/1  and  4 1/ T 1/2 . After stating these 
parameters, the maximum operation tempo of the network can be concluded as [24]: 
 









T   (11) 
 
Figure 14.   Time Spent in Each Phases of the OODA Cycle (after [24]) 
 35
IV. RADARS AND RANGE EQUATIONS 
This section will serve as an introduction to radar systems and data links. Since 
this research aims to examine the electronic attack missions with UAV swarms, it is vital 
to closely review the basics of these technology areas. In a network centric environment, 
radars could be a part of the sensor system, or could be the target. In either case, the 
capabilities and parameters of the radar systems of interest are important. 
A. BASIC RADAR PRINCIPLES 
The working principle of a radar system can be explained as the emission of 
electromagnetic (EM) waves from the transmitter and detection of these waves reflected 
from the target by the receiver. In this way, the radar system detects and locates the 
target. 
Basic components of the radar transmit/receive cycle are shown in Figure 15. In 
this cycle, the receive antenna collects the reflected amount of EM energy that is very 
small compared to originally transmitted energy, and processes it in the receiver circuits. 
The mixer, amplifiers, detectors and analog-to-digital converter (ADC) amplify and 
convert these analog signals into digital signals. Finally, these digital signals are 
processed through a signal processor and the results are displayed.  For the detected range 
R of the target, we can derive an equation using basic physics. Let T  represent the total 
round-trip time of the EM waves from the transmit antenna to the target, and from the 
target to the receive antenna. Since the EM waves travel a distance of 2R in T  seconds, 
the range to the target becomes ([27] pp.4): 
 
R  cT
2   (12) 
1. Clutter 
The received EM waves that reach the receiver are not always necessarily 
reflected back from only the target. There may be some clutter and unwanted reflections 
from other materials. These environmental and natural obstacles are called clutter, and 
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can be mistaken as a target. In such a condition, the clutter return will create an 
equivalent radar cross section (RCS), which will cause a false detection. The RCS of the 
clutter is very important for the radar calculations. The signal-to-clutter ratio (SCR) is 
used for adding the effects of clutter on radar detection and ranging equations. The SCR 
is simply calculated by dividing target RCS ( ) with clutter RCS ( c ) ([27] pp.76):  
 
SCR   c   (13) 
 
 
Figure 15.   Basic Components of Radar Transmit/Receive Cycle (After [27]) 
2. Radar Range Equation 
In the very beginning of this chapter, the basic principle of radar is explained 
briefly. We can extend this main principle into three basic roles, which are to search and 
detect, to track detected contacts and in some applications to create an image of the 
contact [27]. 
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The capability of a radar with given parameters is measured with the radar range 
equation. With regard to the position of the transmit and receive antennas relative to each 
other in a radar system, we can group the radars into three main categories. If the transmit 
and receive antennas are very close to each other or they use the same antenna, this type 
of radar is monostatic. In the case of a slight separation between two antennas that is 
undetectable by the target, this type of radar is called quasi monostatic. In the 
calculations and derivations, monostatic and quasi monostatic radars can be regarded as 
the same. Finally, if the transmit and receive antennas are located in different positions, 
the radar is bistatic [28].  
 
Figure 16.   (a) Bistatic Radar   (b) Monostatic Radar 
If we think about a monostatic radar with a single antenna used for both 
transmitting and receiving EM waves, the range between the radar and target (R) 
determines the power density incident on the target. If Pt is the radar transmitter power 
and Gt is the antenna gain, the power density (Wi) at range R becomes [28]: 
 
Wi  PtGt4R2   (14) 
When the target is illuminated by the transmitted power coming from a distance 
R, a portion of the energy that is proportional to the RCS of the target reflects back to the 
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receiver. The RCS   of a target is dependent on the surface area of the target, 
appearance and architecture of the target, and the substance used for building and 
painting the target. After the reflection, the power density inbound to the radar receiver 
becomes ([27] pp.62): 
 
Prefl Wi  PtGt4R2   (15) 
Reflected power that is reradiated from the target travels the same distance R back 
to the receiver. After this second propagation, scattered power density back at the radar 
becomes [28][29]: 
 




(4R2 )2   (16) 
Scattered EM waves are collected by the receive antenna, which has a finite 
effective area. This is called the effective aperture of the receive antenna (Aer). This can 
be expressed as the physical area of the antenna A multiplied by an efficiency e [28] 
 Aer  Ae   (17) 
Applying the aperture equation, received power at the radar becomes [28][30]: 
 




(4 )2 R4   (18) 
As stated earlier, the portion of the scattered power back at the receive antenna is 
the product of scattered power density and effective aperture area. Effective area can be 
expected in terms of gain as in (19), where wavelength   c / f ( c = speed of light, f = 




4   (19) 




(4 )3 R4   (20) 
Equation (20) is the most basic form of the radar range equation (RRE) and 
derived disregarding many other effects. For more precise calculations, some other 
performance parameters should be included in the RRE. These parameters can be listed 
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as radar system internal and path loses (L) , internal noise, clutter, signal processing gains 











  (21) 
For monostatic radars where transmission and reception are done through the 
same single antenna, we can use a single gain such as Gr Gt G , and then GrGt G2 . 
On the other hand, bistatic radars have two physically separated antennas used to transmit 
and receive the EM energy. In this condition, we have possibly two different ranges. One 
is from the transmit antenna to the target (Rt), and the other is from the target to the 




3. Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
In Section A1, we discussed clutter, which is caused by environmental objects 
that reflect the EM energy. In addition to these undesired reflections, other EM activity in 
the vicinity also affects the radar performance. The activities of other radars, 
communication links, radio stations or emitters that intend to jam the radar system are 
called interference [28]. In addition, we also discussed internal noise, which Blake [32] 
explained as the existence of voltage fluctuations in every circuit due to thermal 
excitation of electrons. 
When observing the received signal power in a radar system very close to the 
noise level, it is hard to decide whether the receiver output voltage is caused by detected 
valid target or by random or intentional noise [32]. Signal processing techniques are not 
an entirely adequate solution to this problem, since the same process is applied to both 
the target-reflected RF energy and to the received noise. We can talk about a minimum 
detectable power (MDP) Pr(min) which is the smallest received power level that can 
overcome the noise [28]. Similarly, if we talk about a minimum detectable signal-to-noise 
power ratio (S/N)min, MDP becomes [32]: 
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 Pr (min)  (S / N )min Pn   (22) 
where Pn is the system noise power. 
According to Nyquist (1928) (cited in [32]), the root-mean-square (RMS) voltage 
(in Volts) produced in a conductor with resistance R and effective temperature Te is: 
 
 En(rms)  4kTeRB   (23) 
where k is the Boltzman’s constant (k = 1.38 x 10-23 J/K), and B is the noise frequency 
bandwidth in which the voltage is measured. 
If we assume an ideal filter where the “filter response is perfectly uniform within 
the bandwidth” [32], as seen in Figure 17 [28], we can say that the filter response is a step 
function: 
H ( f ) 
1, f1  f  f2





In Figure 17, bandwidth is B  f2  f1  and center frequency is fc  f2  f12 .   
 
 
Figure 17.   Ideal Band-limited Filter Response (After [28]) 
If we think of RMS the voltage across the conductor as applied to a matched load, 
where R  Rload , the voltage divider rule will ensure that the voltage and delivered power 
across the load will be: 
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En(load )  4kTeRB2R R  kTeRB   (24) 
and 
 
Pn  En(load )
2
R
 kTeB (25)  
As stated earlier, Te is the effectiove thermal temperature generated by the 
receiver circuits due to movements of free electrons in the system. In addition to the 
effective internal temperature of the system, there are some other external non-thermal 
sources that can produce heat and be detected by the antenna. This is called antenna noise 
temperature [28] TA, and forms system noise temperature combined with receiver 
effective temperature: 
 
 Ts Te TA   (26) 
If we rewrite Equation (22), MDP becomes: 
 
 Pr(min)  (S / N )min kTsBn  (27) 
 
Combining Equation (21) and Equation (27) together, we can state the minimum SNR for 





min 3 4(4 )
r t t r p
s n s n
P PG G G
SNR
kT B R kT B L

    (28) 
For modern radar systems, the minimum SNR values are generally between linear 10 and 
100 [28], or 10 to 20 dB using the simple logarithmic conversion: 
 
 SNRmin (dB)10 log10 (SNRmin(LINEAR) )   (29) 
After the derivation of minimum SNR required to detect a target, we can solve 











R kT B SNR L


        (30) 
4. Radar Cross Section (RCS) 
In the previous section, we derived maximum range by Equation (30). As is true 
for other parameters in the equation, the accurate value of the RCS ( ) is of vital 
importance for the precise determination of maximum range. The RCS of real targets is a 
complicated function of many variables and is greatly influenced by the complexity of 
the target’s shape. These variables can be addressed as operating frequency, target aspect 
angle, and EM wave polarization. For an ideal case, we can assume frequency and EM 
wave polarization constant, but the aspect angle will be a time dependent variable for 
moving targets or radar. This variation will cause the RCS to vary as well [32]. 
The evaluation of RCS is basically accomplished by calculating the scattered 
electric field from a radar target. In words, RCS is represented by [28]: 
 














 are scattered and incident electric field intensities, respectively. The 
incident field is assumed to be a plane wave. 
 RCS is generally measured in dB, and calculated by the same conversion shown 
in Equation (29). Depending on the size of the target, RCS ranges from 10,000 m2 (40 
dBm2) to 0.0001 m2 ( -40 dBm2). The Table 7 shows some typical RCS values [28]. 
Objects RCS (m2) RCS (dBm2) 
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Insects 0.0001 - 40 
Birds 0.01 -20 
Creeping and Travelling 
Waves 
1 0 
Fighter Aircraft 100 20 
Bomber Aircraft 1,000 30 
Ships 10,000 40 
Table 7.   Typical RCS Values of Some Organisms and Objects (After [28]) 
 To better understand the behavior of RCS, we will use Jenn’s [28] special case, 
where an antenna is used as the target (illustrated in Figure 18). We assume that the radar 
and target antennas are pointed at each other. In other words, they are pointed as main 
beam on main beam. The gain and effective area of the target antenna is given by Ga and 
Aea, respectively. We also assume that there is no loss at the terminal, which means 
incident and radiated power are the same. As a result, we can say that target antenna acts 
like an emitter with a transmitted power Pc where: 
 
Pc  PtGt Aea4R2   (32) 
 
Figure 18.   Special Case – Antenna as a Target (After [28]) 




Wr  PcGa4R2   (33) 
and 
 
Pr  Pt Aea
2 GtGr
(4R2 )2   (34) 
 
When compared to Equation (20) and Equation (34), since both equations calculate 




2   2
4   (35) 
 
  4Aea2 2   (36) 
Since wavelength is in the denominator in Equation (36) and it decreases with higher 
frequencies (  c / f ), the RCS of a constant surface area increases with frequency. 
B. RADAR ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES 
The main function of a radar network is to surveil all aspects of a ground asset in 
a given terrain, such that no airborne aggressor can penetrate through this coverage 
without using radar electronic counter measures (RECM). Figure 19 shows the general 
concept of radar coverage with regard to a RECM scenario. The main goal of RECM can 
be one or a combination of any of the following [33]: 
 Deny accurate target detection by an enemy radar system 
 Confuse enemy radar operators 
 Cause delays in detection and tracking 
 Generate false targets displayed on the radar system 
 Overload the radar computer system with false targets 
 Force false target ranging and positioning 
We combine the RECM methods into two basic groups [28] 
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1. Low observability or “stealth:” This method includes manipulating the 
RCS of the target, using radio frequency absorbing materials and shaping. 
2. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM): ECM includes passive techniques 
such as chaff and radar decoys, or active techniques like radar jamming. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Radar Coverage and RECM Scenario – Stand-off (Stand-in) Jamming 
 In this research, we will mainly focus on RECM with regard to jamming. 
Jammers have some characteristic system parameters that identify their capability of the 
jammers. These include the jammer operating bandwidth BJ and effective radiated power 




LJ   (37) 
where LJ is the total jammer loses and GJ is the jammer antenna gain. 
 
 In the following discussion we will basically focus on stand-in jamming (SIJ) 
applications with UAVs accomplished via UAV swarms. Supporting this, we will briefly 
examine Self-Screening Jamming (SSJ) in the next section. We will also take a brief look 
at stand-off jamming (SOJ), since SIJ is very much like SOJ, except for the position and 
range of the jammer to the radar system. 
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1. Self-Screening Jamming (SSJ) 
In SSJ, the airborne target itself conducts radar jamming, using onboard ECM 
systems. This is also commonly referred to as self-protection jamming. If the jammer and 
the target are different vehicles and they are very close such that they appear as a single 
target to the radar system (i.e. they are in the same resolution cell), then this configuration 
can also be treated as SSJ. Since target and jammer are the contained within the same 
platform, then target and jammer distances are equal, R = RJ, relative to the target. On the 
other hand, receive angles for reflected waves from the target and the jammer signals will 
also be the same, ensuring that the jammer uses main beam gain G0. If we say the radar 
has a wavelength  , effective aperture Aer, bandwidth Br, receiver losses L, transmit 
power Pt, and tries to detect a target with RCS   at a distance R, then received power at 





(4 )3 R4L   (38) 
 
 Similarly, PJ is the jammer peak power, GJ is the jammer antenna gain, BJ is the 
jammer operating bandwidth which is usually larger than Br, and LJ is the total jammer 














 ERP  2G
4R2   (39) 
Now, we need to derive S/J ratio for SSJ. If we combine Equation (38) and 







(ERP)4R2L   (40) 
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where Br  1  has been assumed. 
2. Stand-off Jamming 
Stand off jammers typically use very high ERP, since they operate farther out 
from the radar’s lethal targeting area. SOJ creates a safe region for the friendly penetrator 
or penetrators beyond their path. In a SOJ environment as seen in Figure 19, power 














BJ   (41) 






(ERP)4R4L   (42) 
 
We will use the same equations for SIJ. 
3. Jammer Burn-through Range 
We will now use the SOJ scenario in Figure 19 to derive jammer burn-through 
range. Assume that the radar antenna main beam has the gain G0 and directly incident on 
the target with RCS  . Also consider that the jammer has a transmitted power PJ and a 
gain GJ. The radar antenna has gain G(θ) in the direction of the jammer. Then the jammer 
power incident on the radar antenna is [28] 
 
 












(4RJ )2   (43) 
Similarly, if we assume no loss and processing gain in the system, the power 
received at the radar from the target is given by Equation (20). Now, we need to find the 
ratio of the target received signal power to jammer power incident on radar antenna, 
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which is called signal-to-jam ratio (SJR). If we also assume a monostatic radar antenna 































  (44) 
assuming BJ = Br. 
Moreover, if we include Gaussian noise to the jamming, we should also include 
















   (45) 
Remember that k is Boltzman’s constant and Ts is the receiver effective noise 
temperature. 










(4 )2 L S









  (46) 





V. RADAR AND NETWORK ELECTRONIC COUNTER 
MEASURES SIMULATION 
A. SURVEILLANCE RADAR EA SIMULATION 
In this section, we simulate a typical RECM application using MATLAB®. We 
use RADJAM (version 2.2) simulation toolbox [34], burn_thru.m and sir.m files [33] to 
examine burn-through range, detection contours and jamming effects. 
1. Scenario 
We simulate a stand-in jamming profile using a single small UAV. As stated 
earlier, it is infeasible to conduct this mission with such a small platform, since it has 
some size, weight, and power (SWAP) limitations compared to those of conventional 
manned jamming aircraft. We will assume that a single UAV is capable of radiating the 
required jamming power in the given configuration. In other words, we will assume that a 
single UAV has the required power level that can be produced with multiple UAVs in a 
UAV swarm as an emergent behavior. The SIJ configuration used in the simulation is 
shown in Figure 20. In this configuration, both the target and the jammer are assumed to 
be in the radar main beam. Since the radar main beam and the jamming main beam are in 
alignment with each other, and that the target is aligned on the same axis, then the radar, 
target and jammer height are equal. For simplicity, we will assume they are zero while 
not concerning ourselves with Fresnel Zone effects that would be present at or near 
ground elevations. 
 
Figure 20.   SIJ Configuration 
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2. Parameters and Calculations 
We use air surveillance radar operating configurations shown in Table 8. These 
specifications are very realistic and chosen to be similar to the AN/SPS-49 shipboard 
surveillance radar system [35]. 
 
Peak Transmitter Power 360 kW 
Antenna Azimuth Length (m) 7.3 
Antenna Elevation Length (m) 4.3 
Antenna Height (m) 0 
Antenna Gain 29 dB 
Radar Processing Gain 10 dB 
Frequency 900 MHz 
Pulse Width 1 μs 
Noise Bandwidth 1 Mhz 
Antenna Noise Temperature 80 K 
Receiver Noise Temperature 2800 K 
Minimum SNR 15 dB 
Radar Antenna Efficiency 0.9 
Side Lobe Level -35 dB 
Back Lobe Level -60 dB 
Table 8.   Air Surveillance Radar Operating Parameters 
 Before we establish the jammer configuration, we can make some preliminary 
calculations based on our radar parameter performance. First of all, thermal noise power 
from Equation (25) and Equation (26) becomes 
 
Ts  Te TA  280080  2880K 
Pn  kTsB  (1.381023)(2880)(106 ) 3.971014 Watts 
Pn (dBW ) 10 log(3.971014Watts)  134dBW  
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1015/10  31.62 
and 
Pr (min)  SNRminPn 1.261012W  119dBW  
 
Effective radiated power of the radar antenna: 
 
ERP  PtGt  (360103)(1029/10 )  285.96MW  
 









Using MDP in Equation (21) with 5 dB atmospheric losses ahead of the receiver, we 
calculate the maximum range for the target given in Table 9. 
 
Target RCS (m2) 10 
Target Height 0 
Table 9.    Airborne Target Specifications 
Proceeding with the calculation of maximum range, since 
2
3 4(4 )








Rmax  231.47km 
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Note that the calculated maximum range does not include aperture efficiency and 
maximum gain of the radar antenna. RADJAM results return the maximum range 
calculated with these included. 
 Jammer operating parameters are shown in Table 10. For SIJ, we assume that the 
UAV jammer position is fixed. This is impossible in reality. However, if we use two 
UAVs orbiting at a given coordinate as seen in Figure 21 and neglect the length of the 
flight path inbound to the radar antenna, we can assume a fixed stand-in jammer. In this 
orbit configuration, two UAVs synchronize with each other and one of them is always 
inbound to the radar antenna with jamming on while the other is outbound with no 
jamming radiated towards the target radar. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Jammer Configuration 


















 56.22104  22.5dB
 
 
Jammer Height (m) 0 
Jammer Range (m) 5000 
Azimuth (Deg) 0 
Jammer Gain (dB) 5 
Jammer Power (W) 20 
Jammer Bandwidth (MHz) 10 
Table 10.   Jammer Operating Parameters 
3. Simulation Results 
Radar, jammer, and target parameters are entered into the RADJAM graphical 
user interface (GUI) as seen in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22.   RADJAM GUI Inputs 
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 Since we assumed that the radar main beam, the target and the jammer are all on 
the same plane, we can easily examine the azimuth tracking of the radar system. The 
detection contour of the radar is plotted and shown in Figure 23. Without jamming, the 
maximum detection range is 357.65 km and represented by a circle on the detection 
contour plot. 
 
Figure 23.   Detection Contour without Jamming 
 The radar antenna is located at the center of the plot and shown by R, and the 
jammer position is represented by symbol J. Since the radar system simulates a 
surveillance radar, it has relatively long range coverage compared to smaller surface 
search radars. As a result, the R and J symbols are very close to each other due to the 
close SIJ range. The polar antenna pattern is plotted and shown in Figure 24. The antenna 
pattern plot includes antenna efficiency and computed antenna dimensions. When the 
jammer is active and in the main beam, the resulting detection contour with jammer is 




Figure 24.   Azimuth Antenna Pattern 
 
Figure 25.   Detection Contour with Jamming 
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 The MATLAB® function “esraberilela.m,” given in Appendix A, calculates SJR 
and burn-through range using Equation (45) and Equation (46). To show the SJR versus 
detection range, the UAV is assumed to be performing SSJ. In other words, jammer and 
target assumed to be the same aircraft.  Keeping the ERP of the jammer constant, SJR 
and detection range are plotted in Figure 26. The burn-through range is calculated for our 
SIJ scenario by the MATLAB® function and returned to be -22.5012 dB. This is the same 
result as calculated in Section 5C. 
 
 
Figure 26.   SJR versus Detection Range 
 We know that the burn-through range occurs when SJR=1. This happens when 
signal power is equal to jammer plus noise power. Since they are equal, division of equal 
values in Equation (45) gives unity. Figure 27 shows the relative signal and jamming 
amplitude (dB) versus range normalized to burn-through range.  When we examine 
Equation (44) closely, we can infer a few fundamental characteristics [28]: 
 Being located at a different and closer position to the radar, the jammer 
can utilize the range advantage, (RJ)2 versus (R)4. 
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 Typically radar antennas have higher gain compared to jammer antenna 
gain, G versus G(θ). This generally goes against the effectiveness of the 
jammer. If the jammer is in the main beam as in our scenario, it is not a 
disadvantage anymore. 
 Sidelobe cancellation methods decrease the effectiveness of the jammer. 
 When assumed to be stationary at a given geometry, the jammer can only 
control the ERP. 
 Radar operators can easily detect jamming and can locate the jammer 
using other techniques. 
 
Figure 27.   Target and Jammer Signals versus Range Normalized to Burn-through Range 
B. INFORMATION NETWORK EA SIMULATION 
 In this section, we simulate network electronic counter measures (NECM) 
application using LPISimNet, developed by Pace and Chen [21, 36]. We will see the 
affects of a very basic EA attack mission using UAVs against a netted enemy integrated 
air defense system (NEADS). In today’s warfare environment with improved 
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technologies, EA against a radar does not insure the suppression of enemy air defenses 
(SEAD). EA against a radar system within a NEADS can be compensated for by other 
enemy systems connected with data links. However, EA missions against such point 
targets can harm, weaken, deceive, and delay enemy decision-making and lengthen the 
OODA cycle. To show the EA effects on a NEADS, we use the operational NCW 
parameters established in Chapter IIIB to simulate two different warfare topologies. The 
first one will show a 3-node NEADS topology without a jammer. The second simulation 
will show a 4-node warfare topology, involving a UAV jammer swarm. In contrast to 
common usage, the enemy forces and NEADS are labeled “blue forces,” and the UAV 
jammer swarm is labeled as “red forces” in this simulation. 
1. 3-Node NEADS Simulation 
In the first simulation, we model a NEADS operational network with three nodes 
connected with data links, shown in Figure 28 and in Table 11. These three nodes are a 
surveillance radar site, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site, and an F-16 air-to-air 
interceptor wing. Simulation results will show the calculations based on NCW metrics 
introduced in Chapter IIIB. 
 
Figure 28.   NEADS Operational Network without Jammer 
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Link Connections 
  TO 1 2 3 
FROM   
1   Yes Yes 
2 Yes   Yes 
3 Yes No   
 
Table 11.   NEADS Link Connections without Jammer 
a. Simulation Setup 
The simulation setup and NEADS topology are shown in Figure 29. The 
scenario setup is shown in Table 12. In this NEADS configuration, the surveillance radar 
site is considered to be an operational NCW command and control center (NCWC2C) 
with an information capability of 1. There is no link connection from the SAM site to the 
F-16 fighter aircraft, shown by the decreased information capability of the SAM site with 
a value of 0.4. 
 
Figure 29.   NEADS Topology without Jammer 
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Number of Nodes 3 
Decision Tempo (Hz) 200 
Deployment Tempo (Hz) 300 
Fighting Tempo (Hz) 400 
  Information 
Node Index Asset Name Capability Rate (Hz) Min. Rate (Hz) 
1 Radar 1 300 100 
2 F-16 0.8 200 100 
3 SAM 0.4 200 75 
Table 12.    NEADS Simulation Setup without Jammer 
b. Simulation Results 
After running the simulation, network parameters are calculated for the 3-
node NEADS as seen in Figure 30. Detailed MATLAB® calculations are shown below. 
------------------------------------------ 
Analysis of Reference Connectivity Measure 
------------------------------------------ 
Number_of_Node   Reference_Connectivity_Measure 
3                9 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Analysis of Connectivity Measure at Time index = 1-5 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Route   Bottleneck_Node  Contribution_to 
       Connectivity_Measure 
-1-2      1                  1 
-1-3      1                  1 
-1-2-3    2                  0.4 
-2-1      2                  0.8 
-2-3-1    3                  0.2 
-2-3     2                  0.8 
-2-1-3   2                  0.4 
-3-1     3                  0.4 
-3-1-2    3                  0.2 
Connectivity Measure= 5.2 
---------------------------- 
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Analysis of Network Richness 
---------------------------- 
Network Richness = 111.5984 
 
 
Figure 30.   NEADS Topology without Jammer Simulation Results 
2. 3-Node NEADS with UAV Jammer Swarm Simulation 
In the second simulation, we model a NEADS operational network with three 
nodes connected with data links and attacked by a UAV jammer swarm, shown in Figure 
31 and in Table 13. 
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Figure 31.   NEADS Operational Network with UAV Jammer 
 
Link Connections 
  TO 1 2 3 4 
FROM   
1   Yes Yes No 
2 Yes   Yes No 
3 Yes No   No 
4 Yes No No   
 
Table 13.   NEADS Link Connections with UAV Jammer 
a. Simulation Setup 
The simulation setup and NEADS topology is shown in Figure 32. The scenario 
setup is shown in Table 14. In this NEADS configuration, a UAV jammer swarm applies 
EA against the radar site. Since the UAV jammer has a moving capability, we added 5 
time indexes to our simulation. We assume that the F-16 air-to-air fighter aircraft orbits at 
a given location which can be thought of as stationary. However, the UAV jammer 
swarm moves at a given velocity, 8 km per time index toward the radar in this simulation. 
 63
 
Figure 32.   NEADS Topology with UAV Jammer 
Number of Nodes 4 
Number of Time Indexes 5 
Decision Tempo 200 
Deployment Tempo 300 
Fighting Tempo 400 
  Information 
Node Index Asset Name Capability Rate (Hz) Min. Rate (Hz) 
1 Radar 1 300 100 
2 F-16 0.8 200 100 
3 SAM 0.4 200 75 
4 
UAV 
SWARM 0.4     
Table 14.   NEADS Simulation Setup with UAV Jammer 
b. Simulation Results 
The simulation results for 5 time indexes are shown in Table 15. As seen 
from the results, EA against the NEADS links harms the enemy OODA cycle. In this 
specific simulation setup, the NEADS lost two link connections. The information link 
connection from the SAM to the radar was jammed in time index 1. In time index 2, the 
information link from the F-16 to the radar was jammed by the UAV swarm. Without any 
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link connection from its weapon systems, it is impossible for a NCWC2C to maintain 
situational awareness during any type of mission. 
Time Index Metrics Result Map Links Suppressed
1 
 CM
R  9 
 
SAM to Radar 
Suppressed 
 CM  4.4 
 IR  0.49 
 RQ  221.46 
 T  108.27 
 OODA  25.95 
2 
 CM
R  9 
 
SAM to Radar and F-
16 to Radar 
Suppressed 
 CM  3.2 
 IR  0.36 
 RQ  221.46 
 T  78.74 
 OODA  20.44 
3 
 CM
R  9 
 
SAM to Radar and F-
16 to Radar 
Suppressed 
-No New- 
 CM  3.2 
 IR  0.36 
 RQ  221.46 
 T  78.74 
 OODA  20.44 
4 
 CM
R  9 
 
SAM to Radar and F-
16 to Radar 
Suppressed 
-No New- 
 CM  3.2 
 IR  0.36 
 RQ  221.46 
 T  78.74 
 OODA  20.44 
5 
 CM
R  9 
 
SAM to Radar and F-
16 to Radar 
Suppressed 
-No New- 
 CM  3.2 
 IR  0.36 
 RQ  221.46 
 T  78.74 
 OODA  20.44 
Table 15.   NEADS with UAV Jammer Simulation Results 
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The simulation results and EA effects against the NEADS can also be 
examined directly looking at the trends of NCW. Trend graphics of reference 
connectivity measure, connectivity measure, network reach, and OODA cycle tempos are 
given in Figures 33, 34 and 35. A negative slope in the trends of connectivity measure, 
network reach, and characteristic tempo in time index 1 and time index 2 shows the 
effects of EA against the NEADS. 
 
Figure 33.   Trends of Reference Connectivity Measure and Connectivity Measure 
 





















VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this research was to examine stand-in-jamming missions 
against radars and information links using UAV swarms. Swarming technologies have 
undergone dramatic improvements parallel to improvements in the network-centric 
operations (NCO) concept. NCO emerged as a business model at the beginning of 21st 
Century. The idea was to create and share information within a network of different 
companies operating in the same environment. This new idea was adopted as a military 
concept, network-centric warfare (NCW). NCW depends on netted warfighting assets 
that share and relay information using data links. To show the effectiveness of networks 
and measure the networking capabilities, we examined the NCW metrics thoroughly. 
UAVs are being used for very diverse military applications. Using UAVs for EA 
missions is not a new idea; however, to swarm a number of small UAVs to create the 
same emergent capability compared to that of traditional jamming aircraft is relatively 
new.  Although UAVs have some inherent drawbacks regarding their payload and power 
capacity, the swarm behavior can collectively overcome these disadvantages. Moreover, 
the smaller RCS that UAVs possess is a very important advantage in airborne EA 
missions. Smaller body structures and RCSs makes it possible to use UAV swarms 
positioned closer to the enemy integrated air defense systems, making SIJ using UAV 
swarms possible. 
To examine UAV swarm EA missions, we examined the distributed beamforming 
and wireless communication networks. UAV swarms and distributed beamforming are 
proposed as an economic solution to overcome transmission loses and conduct EA closer 
to the target receivers. We regarded UAV swarms as a warfighting asset in the NCW 
environment. The swarm itself is a network of autonomous individuals synchronized to a 
reference node within the swarm. Self-synchronization is a very important requirement 
for distributed beamforming and swarming behavior. 
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Finally, we modeled and simulated EA missions against a typical air surveillance 
radar and a three-node information network. Since they still apply to any platform being 
detected or aiming to jam the receiver, we examined the radar range equations prior to 
comparing them to the simulation results. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In a NCW environment, information sharing among the assets in a timely manner 
is critical. In times of heightened tensions or war, both friendly and enemy forces operate 
in their own network and make decisions using their own OODA cycle. Since NCW 
consists of multiple information nodes within the network, loss of one to a few individual 
link connections can be easily tolerated, depending on the robust nature of the network 
design. For example, a radar system can be jammed by a hostile jammer and totally lose 
individual situational awareness. However, other information nodes and receivers in the 
same network provide accurate information about the jamming and jammer position to 
the IADS. In other words, the incapacitated state of the victim radar can be tolerated 
within the network. Real time information transfer using data links results in a very 
powerful warfighting capability. 
In the first part of the simulation, the RADJAM simulation toolbox helped to 
illustrate the jamming effect on an air surveillance radar. The detection contour shows 
how the energy of the radar is countered by the SIJ. The radar undergoing a SIJ attack 
was unable to detect the target and the jammer without having any netted connection 
from other information sources. Although the direction of the jammer can be easily 
concluded from the detection contour, it is still problematic to detect the targets. This 
means that the radar will have no accurate information about the jammer and target, 
regarding their number, range, altitude, and heading. 
On the other hand, this research and the simulation results showed that an EA 
mission against radar systems and data links affects the decision-making capability of the 
adversary. This is very important in today’s wars, especially for time-critical missions. 
The EA against data links simulation with LPISimNet in Chapter V showed that the 
connectivity measure (CM ), network reach ( IR ), information exchange frequency (T ), 
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and operation tempo (OODA ) decreased considerably in the first two time indexes where 
the jammer successfully jammed two data links. Moreover, the victim node in the 
simulation was the NCW headquarters that makes the jamming more advantageous 
against NEADS OODA cycle. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Although we introduce a brief explanation of swarming, we assumed that a single 
UAV has the required parameters for EA that can, in reality, be achieved by swarm 
behavior of multiple UAVs. Emergent behavior of self-synchronized autonomous UAVs 
can result in the same ERP of a conventional jammer aircraft. A UAV swarm is a 
network of autonomous nodes connected by wireless communication links. Distributed 
beamforming is a result of swarm behavior of these nodes. As stated earlier in this 
research, all the nodes in the swarm network should self-synchronized to a common 
node. Self-synchronization and emergent ERP production of a UAV swarm may be 
examined in detail in a future work. 
UAV swarm networks use wireless links to share the information for intra-swarm 
and inter-swarm communications. Wireless networks have some hereditary drawbacks. 
They are open and vulnerable to jamming as is every wireless communication. The 
effectiveness and results of an EA against UAV swarms may be investigated in a future 
study. 
Since the UAV are considered as communication and sensor nodes in the swarm, 
NCW metrics and calculations apply for the UAV network. As a result, the loss of a 
single or multiple UAV in the swarm decrease the NCW parameters and change the 
effectiveness of swarming. On the other hand, a few losses can be tolerated without 
considerably changing the operational power of the swarm. NCW metrics within the 












%File Name :esraberilela.m 
%Author          :Ali Kaptan 
%Date            :18 July 2012 
% 
%Function        :Calculates and plots detection range  
%    versus SJR and relative  
%                 signal and jamming ratio vs range   
%    normalized to burn-through range. 
%                  
% 
%Courtesy        :Original idea of these calculations  
%    and plots cited from  
%                 Mahafza and Elsherbeni (2000) [32].  
%    However, the codes  
%                 are re-written according to the  






% RADAR PARAMETERS 
******************************************************** 
Pt = 360e3;        % Radar trasmitter power 
TA = 80;           % Antenna temperature 
Te = 2800;         % Effective temperature of radar receiver 
Ts = TA+Te;        % Radar system noise temperature 
er = 0.9;          % Radar antenna efficiency 
freq = 0.9e9;      % Frequency 
c = 3e8;           % Velocity of light 
tau = 1e-6;        % Pulsewidth 
wave = c/freq;     % Wavelength 
k = 2*pi/wave;     % Wave number (propagation constant) 
ta = 1e-6;         % Radar pulse width 
boltz = 1.38e-23;  % Boltzman's constant 
Gantdb = 29;       % Antenna gain 
  
  
% TARGET PARAMETERS 
******************************************************* 
rcsdb = 10;        % Target rcs 
Rtar = 20000;      % Target Range 
  
% JAMMER PARAMETERS 
******************************************************* 
Gjdb = 5;          % Jammer gain in direction of radar (in 
db) 
hj = 0;            % Jammer altitude 
Bj = 10e6;         % Jammer bandwidth 
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Pj = 20;           % Jammer transmitter power 
Rj = 5000;         % Jammer range fixed 
  
% Max detection range with no jamming (From RADJAM Results) 
RRmax=384000; 
  
    
%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%Basic Calculations and Conversions 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
Gj = 10^(Gjdb/10); 
rcs = 10^(rcsdb/10); 
Gant = 10^(Gantdb/10); 
ERPr = Pt*Gant;     %Radar ERP 
ERPj = Pj*Gj;       %Jammer ERP 
Aer = Gant*wave^2/(4*pi);   %Effective Area 









Rinc = linspace(0, RRmax, 1000); 
SJR = Rinc; 
  
for i=1:1000 
demoS = ERPr*rcs*(Aer)*tau/(4^2*pi^2*Rinc(i)^4); 
demoSJR = demoS / demoJN; 
SJR(i) = 10*log10(demoSJR); 
end 
  
Rinc = Rinc./1000; 
figure(1) 
plot(Rinc, SJR, 'k'); 
xlabel('Detection Range in Km'); 
ylabel('SJR in dB'); 
grid; 
  
Star = ERPr*rcs*(Aer)*tau/(4^2*pi^2*Rtar^4); 
SJRtar = 10*log10(Star / demoJN); 
disp(['Signal-to-Jammer Ratio for the target at ',... 




%%Show Burn-Through Range for SSJ 




S_ssj_demo = Pt*Gant*rcs*Aer*tau/(4^2*pi^2); 
JN_ssj_demo = ERPj*Aer/(4*pi*Bj); 
S_ssj = 1:1:1000; 
JN_ssj = 1:1:1000; 
  
  
for j = 1:1000 
    S_ssj(j) = 10*log10(S_ssj_demo/(Rinc(j)*1000)^4); 





semilogx(Rinc, S_ssj, 'k', Rinc, JN_ssj, 'k-'); 
xlabel('Range Normilized to Burn-Through Range'); 
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